Source: Dispatch of the Federal Council on the Bilateral III package, Chapter 2.2.11–2.2.12 (pp. 249–265)
PDF of the Dispatch
The introduction of state aid monitoring has moderate personnel and financial implications for the Confederation and the cantons. The Confederation estimates approximately 10 notifiable or GBER-covered aid measures per year, with set-up costs of CHF 500,000 and running costs of CHF 200,000 per year. The economic impact is positive: strengthened competition and equal framework conditions. Constitutionality is based on Art. 54, 95 and 101 of the Federal Constitution.
| Position |
FTE |
Task |
| COMCO aid chamber |
7.5 |
Examination procedures, opinions, register |
| SECO (competence centre) |
2.0 |
Coordination, advisory, international contacts |
| Total |
9.5 |
|
| Item |
Amount |
Period |
| Set-up costs |
CHF 500,000 |
2031/2032 (one-off) |
| Running costs |
CHF 200,000/year |
From 2033 |
| Personnel costs COMCO |
Within COMCO global budget |
Ongoing |
| Personnel costs SECO |
Within EAER global budget |
Ongoing |
- 5 notifiable aid measures per year (requiring simple or in-depth examination)
- 5 GBER aid measures per year (exempt from notification, but subject to registration)
- Significantly fewer cases than in EU Member States of comparable size
- Reason: narrow scope (only 3 agreements)
| Phase |
FTE |
Duration |
| Set-up phase |
8.5 |
2–3 years |
| Ongoing operations |
2.0 |
Permanent |
- Inventory: recording of existing cantonal aid
- Notification: notification of cantonal aid within the scope
- Adaptation: cantonal legislative adaptations where necessary
- Advisory: advice for municipalities and cantonal offices
- Advisory services chargeable: COMCO advisory services are invoiced
- Legislative adaptations: cantonal adaptations at own expense
- Training: participation in federal training programmes
State aid monitoring has predominantly positive economic effects:
- Strengthened competitiveness: equal framework conditions for CH and EU undertakings
- Market access: securing internal market access in the three sectors
- Price discipline: consumers benefit indirectly from fair competition
- Investment certainty: clear rules increase planning security for undertakings
- Location attractiveness: transparent aid policy as a location factor
- Administrative burden: notification obligation for aid-granting bodies
- Examination periods: 2–12 months waiting time for notifiable aid
- Adaptation needs: existing aid regimes must be reviewed
The Federal Council assesses the net effect as clearly positive, particularly due to the secured market access.
State aid monitoring theoretically also affects the promotion of renewable energy, as the Electricity Agreement falls within the scope:
- Decarbonisation: aid for climate protection and decarbonisation is explicitly excluded
- Renewable energy: promotion of renewable energy falls under GBER exceptions
- Energy efficiency: energy efficiency measures are exempted
- Network infrastructure: as SGEI, largely excluded from monitoring
- Swiss energy and climate policy is not restricted by aid monitoring
- Numerous exceptions safeguard the room for manoeuvre
- The GBER covers virtually all relevant environmental and energy aid
The Federal Council notes that aid monitoring has no notable social impact:
- Public service remains entirely outside the scope
- Social institutions are not affected
- The education system is not affected (except where directly related to the 3 agreements)
- The healthcare system is not affected
State aid monitoring is based on several constitutional foundations:
| Constitutional article |
Content |
Relevance |
| Art. 54(1) FC |
Foreign affairs (federal competence) |
Conclusion of the international aid protocols |
| Art. 95(2) first sentence FC |
Private economic activity |
Authorisation to regulate competition |
| Art. 101(1) FC |
External economic policy |
Safeguarding the interests of the Swiss economy |
- Cross-sectoral: the Confederation is competent for the entire scope of the D-SAMA
- Inclusion of cantonal aid: the Confederation can rely on Art. 95(2) first sentence FC to also monitor cantonal aid
- No constitutional amendment required: existing constitutional bases are sufficient
- The Confederation can, based on Art. 95(2) first sentence FC, regulate the monitoring of cantonal aid
- This is constitutionally permissible as it concerns securing internal market access
- The cantons retain their autonomy in granting aid
- Only monitoring (not aid policy itself) is centralised at the federal level
State aid monitoring is compatible with WTO subsidy rules:
- SCM Agreement: the provisions are compatible with the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
- Most-favoured-nation clause: no discrimination against other WTO members
- National treatment: equal treatment of domestic and foreign undertakings within the scope
- No conflicts: the bilateral aid provisions complement the WTO regime without violating it
| Aspect |
Details |
| FTE Confederation |
9.5 (7.5 COMCO + 2 SECO) |
| Set-up costs |
CHF 500,000 (one-off) |
| Running costs |
CHF 200,000/year |
| FTE cantons |
8.5 (set-up) → 2.0 (ongoing operations) |
| Cases per year |
~5 notifiable + ~5 GBER |
| Economy |
Net effect positive (market access) |
| Environment |
No restriction (exceptions secured) |
| Society |
No notable impact |
| Constitutional basis |
Art. 54, 95, 101 FC |
| WTO |
Compatible with SCM Agreement |