Summary: The sanctions ban (Art. 54a para. 3) is the most controversial part of the initiative. Critics warn of Switzerland as a circumvention hub, secondary sanctions from the USA/EU, and pressure on the financial centre. Historians emphasise: Switzerland has never been able to entirely avoid the sanctions of its neighbours.
If accepted, the current EU sanctions against Russia would no longer be possible [1]. Only UN Security Council sanctions and anti-circumvention measures would remain permissible.
Without its own sanctions, Switzerland could become a circumvention hub for sanctioned funds and goods. This would be particularly problematic given the significance of the Swiss financial centre (CHF 7.4 bn in frozen Russian assets) [2].
The USA employs secondary sanctions that can also affect non-US financial institutions. Consequences: restricted access to the US financial system, reputational damage [3].
Simon Michel (FDP/SO, National Councillor): "Not being allowed to sanction Russia after the attack on Ukraine? The SVP wants to isolate us!" [4]
Historians emphasise: Switzerland has historically never been able to avoid the sanctions of its neighbours and trading partners [5].
[1] Federal Council (2024). Dispatch. [Open Access]
[2] SECO (2022). FAQ Sanctions. [Open Access]
[3] Lindemann Law (2024). Secondary Sanctions. [Open Access]
[4] SRF (2026). National Council debate. [Open Access]
[5] SRF (2025). Historian on neutrality. [Open Access]
[6] neutralitaet-ja.ch (2024). Argumentarium. Note: Position paper of the initiative committee
Last updated: March 2026