Summary: The dynamic adoption of law is the most criticised aspect of the Bilateral Agreements III. Critics see it as a creeping loss of regulatory independence, since Switzerland must adopt EU law without having a vote in its creation. Supporters counter that Switzerland already voluntarily mirrors EU norms today and the new system provides a formal right to participate for the first time.
With the dynamic adoption of law, Switzerland commits to adopting relevant developments in EU law in the areas covered by the agreements as a matter of principle (-> Dynamic Adoption of Law). Critics argue [1]:
Switzerland receives a right to participate in the drafting of new EU legal acts ("Decision Shaping"). However, critics argue that this participation is without voting rights and therefore ineffective. The EU ultimately decides alone, and Switzerland must adopt the result [1][6].
The criticism relates to the potential reach of the adoption obligation. The question of which EU legal acts will in future fall within the scope of the agreements is the subject of a legal debate [4].
Supporters emphasise that the scope of the dynamic adoption of law is limited [5][7]:
Switzerland already voluntarily mirrors a large part of EU law today ("autonomous adaptation") to maintain the competitiveness of its economy. The difference: with autonomous adaptation, this happens without a formal framework and without a right to participate. The Bilateral Agreements III formalise this process and grant Switzerland a right to co-shape for the first time [5][7].
The dynamic adoption of law in the Schengen/Dublin area has been functioning since 2008 without major problems. During this time, around 460 EU legal acts were adopted, of which approximately 50 with parliamentary approval and 3 with a popular vote [7].
Switzerland retains the right to refuse any individual EU legal act. The consequence is proportionate compensatory measures -- not automatic termination of the agreement [3][5].
-> Criticism of the opt-out: The Opt-out Dilemma
The question of whether the dynamic adoption of law represents an acceptable price for single market access is at the centre of the political debate. It is assessed differently depending on one's standpoint:
| Perspective | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Regulatory policy (liberal) | Loss of regulatory autonomy outweighs economic benefits |
| Economic pragmatism | Formalisation of the already practised adaptation with a right to participate |
| Democratic policy | Tension between sovereignty and international cooperation |
The consultation on the Switzerland-EU package (autumn 2025) has considerably substantiated the criticism of sovereignty loss.
Critics use the term "democracy bypass" to describe the mechanism whereby popular votes on EU law adoption remain formally possible but take place under the constant pressure of compensatory measures. The SVP argues in its consultation response that "it is no longer the people and the cantons, but the EU that is the supreme legislator" [11]. The electorate can still vote, but always under the "sword of Damocles" of economic sanctions -- making a free vote impossible [11].
Supporters counter that the Schengen/Dublin precedent shows how dynamic adoption of law and direct democracy are compatible (-> Schengen Precedent) [7].
The SME and Trade Association of Canton Lucerne (KGL) judges the dynamic adoption of law "most critically" and speaks of a "substantial loss of self-determination". The KGL literally states: "Self-determination is a central achievement of Swiss direct democracy, developed and proven over generations" [12]. At the same time, the KGL acknowledges the economic benefits for Lucerne's export industry and the legal certainty the package would bring [12].
Prof. Carl Baudenbacher, former President of the EFTA Court (2003-2018), sharply criticises the dispute settlement model. He characterises the construction as "judicial imperialism" and compares it to "extraterritorial courts of imperialist powers in the 19th century" [13]. The arbitration tribunal is "camouflage", since the CJEU has the final say on all EU law questions [13].
Supporters point out that the CJEU only decides on the interpretation of EU law, not on its application in a specific case. The latter remains with the parity arbitration tribunal (-> "Foreign Judges") [3].
[1] UNSER RECHT (2026). Bilateral III -- what is it about? Information platform. [Open Access]
[3] FDFA (2026). Fact sheet: Institutional elements. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. [Open Access]
[4] FDFA (2025). Expert opinion Prof. Hahn: Dynamic adoption of law. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. [Open Access]
[5] FDFA (2026). Switzerland-EU Package (Bilateral III). Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. [Open Access]
[6] University of Zurich (2022). Langer: Democratic participation in the bilateral relationship. Europa Institut Zurich. [Open Access]
[7] economiesuisse (2026). Bilateral III -- The best option. Dossier Politik. [Open Access] Note: Business federation.
[11] SVP (2025). Consultation Response on the CH-EU Package. Swiss People's Party. [Open Access] Note: Largest opposition party.
[12] KGL (2025). Position Paper on Bilateral III. SME and Trade Association of Canton Lucerne. [Open Access]
[13] Baudenbacher, Carl (2026). With the new EU treaties, Switzerland descends to the level of developing countries. Schweizer Monat. [Open Access]
Last updated: March 2026