Army XXI: Historical Lessons

¶ 5. Army XXI: Historical Lessons

¶ 5.1 The 2004 Reform

On 18 May 2003, the Swiss electorate approved Army XXI with 76% (Swissvotes: 495.00; Federal Chancellery, 2003). The reform promised 120,000-140,000 active personnel, 80,000 reserves, and a budget of CHF 4.3 billion per year (Parliament: 02.053).

¶ 5.2 Promises vs. Reality

Reduction of main weapon systems between 1990 and 2025:

Military historian Mantovani: "Switzerland has lost its defense capability" (NZZ, 2022). The NZZ documents the "policy failure regarding the Swiss Army" (NZZ, 2023). The Officers' Society "Panzer" estimates the total requirement at CHF 100 billion (NZZ, 2024).

¶ 5.3 Assessment by the Chief of the Armed Forces

Chief of the Armed Forces Thomas Suessli stated in December 2025 (NZZ, 2025; SRF, 2025):

• "Switzerland cannot defend itself autonomously"
• Only one third of ground forces can be fully equipped
• Merely 8% of Swiss territory can be effectively protected
• Defense capability "at the earliest by 2050"

Suessli resigned at the end of 2025 (DDPS: Suessli Resignation). The WEA 2018 was a corrective attempt with a target strength of 100,000 (DDPS: WEA).

¶ 5.4 Five Key Lessons

1. Reform promises must be financially secured -- legally anchored minimum budget thresholds
2. Growth concepts are no substitute for standing capabilities -- what is lost can only be restored at enormous cost
3. Threat assessments are uncertain -- robust policy plans for the most dangerous plausible scenario
4. Democratic legitimacy alone does not guarantee reform success -- the executive must provide the means
5. Critical voices deserve a hearing -- warnings were too often ignored

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