¶ Defence Procurement Reform -- A Vision

The lessons from six decades of Swiss defence procurement speak a clear language: what Switzerland needs is not another internal reorganisation within the DDPS, but an institutional break -- an independent, professionally autonomous procurement authority modelled on FINMA or ENSI. This page analyses international best practices, formulates ten criteria for a modern procurement authority, and presents a concrete organisational structure.

Note: In addition to documented facts, this page contains the author's own analysis and conclusions, which are marked as such. The proposed organisational structure is a contribution to the discussion, not a definitive solution. For the detailed analysis of weaknesses in the current armasuisse, see armasuisse Weaknesses.

¶ 1. Why an Institutional Break Is Necessary

¶ 1.1 Six Decades of Failed Internal Reforms

Since the Mirage affair of 1964, Switzerland has undergone numerous reorganisations of its defence procurement: Kriegstechnische Abteilung (KTA) → Gruppe für Rüstungsdienste (GRD) → Gruppe Rüstung (GR) → armasuisse (2003/04). Each of these reforms operated within the same institutional framework: an administrative unit subordinate to and bound by directives from the DDPS [1].

The reports of the Swiss Federal Audit Office (EFK), the Control Committees (GPK) and the Parliamentary Control of the Administration (PVK) have documented the same structural patterns for decades: lack of contract expertise, cost overruns, insufficient evaluation independence, and political interference in technical decisions [2] [3]. For a detailed analysis of these weaknesses, see armasuisse Weaknesses.

The Federal Council's armaments policy strategy of June 2025 addresses ten fields of action but does not tackle the institutional foundation [4]. It continues to operate within the existing framework -- armasuisse as a directive-bound federal office within the DDPS.

¶ 1.2 The Fundamental Problem: armasuisse in the Four-Circle Model

The Four-Circle Model of federal corporate governance (Federal Council report 2006) distinguishes four circles of increasing autonomy [5]:

Circle 1 -- Core Administration: Federal offices directly within the line organisation
Circle 2 -- FLAG/NFB Units: Administrative units with extended autonomy (performance mandate, global budget), but bound by directives
Circle 3 -- Autonomous Entities: Public-law institutions with their own legal personality (FINMA, ENSI, Swissmedic)
Circle 4 -- Federal Enterprises: Corporations owned by the Confederation (SBB, Post, Swisscom)

armasuisse operates in Circle 2 -- with a performance mandate and global budget, but without its own legal personality, without its own personnel law, and without its own supervisory body. The head of the DDPS has full directive authority [6].

Four-Circle Model of the Confederation
Four-Circle Model: armasuisse (Circle 2) should be transferred to Circle 3 -- the same institutional level as FINMA, ENSI and Swissmedic.

¶ 1.3 What Has Not Worked So Far

Author's analysis: The reform approaches to date can be divided into four categories, all of which operate within the existing institutional framework:

New specifications and processes: Formal regulations do not change the fundamental structure of directive dependency.
Additional controlling bodies: More control within the same system creates additional bureaucracy, not more independence.
Further EFK reports: The EFK can only audit and recommend; implementation lies with the DDPS itself.
Federal Council's armaments policy strategy (June 2025): Addresses symptoms (10 fields of action), not the institutional root cause [4].

¶ 2. International Comparison: How Other Countries Do It

A look beyond the national borders shows that numerous states have institutionally separated their defence procurement from the armed forces. The following overview is based on official government agency websites and the Library of Parliament Canada report [7].

¶ 2.1 South Korea: DAPA -- The Civilian Revolution (2006)

The Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) was established in 2006 as an independent authority to centralise procurement previously handled by the individual service branches. A high proportion of staff are civilians — the civilian quota was a declared reform objective -- a deliberate break with the military-dominated tradition. DAPA manages a procurement budget of over 7 trillion KRW (2024) [8].

¶ 2.2 Sweden: FMV -- The Model for Small States

The Försvarets materielverk (FMV) is Sweden's procurement authority with approximately 3,000 employees and a contract volume of 68.3 billion SEK (2024). The Swedish constitution prohibits ministers from intervening in operational decisions of government agencies (ministerial ban). The separation between client (Försvarsmakten, the armed forces) and contractor (FMV) is institutionally anchored [9] [10].

¶ 2.3 UK: DE&S -- Arm's Length with Its Own Pay Structure

Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) employs approximately 12,500 staff and manages an annual budget of 12.2 billion GBP (2024/25). As an Executive Agency of the Ministry of Defence, DE&S operates on an arm's-length basis with its own board and its own pay structure. According to its own figures, DE&S has significantly improved budget adherence since gaining operational independence [11] [12].

¶ 2.4 France: DGA -- The Engineering Corps

The Direction générale de l'armement (DGA) employs approximately 10,500 staff, of whom 60 per cent are managers, engineers or experts. It has its own test centres and operates lifecycle management across the entire service life of systems. The DGA is a central directorate within the Ministry of Defence, but holds a de facto strong position through its technical expertise [13] [14].

¶ 2.5 Australia: DDA -- The Most Recent Reform (December 2025)

In December 2025, Australia announced the largest reform of its defence procurement in over 50 years: the existing CASG will be transformed into an independent Defence Delivery Agency (DDA), which is to operate as a Non-Corporate Commonwealth Entity (fully operational from 2027). A newly created National Armaments Director reports directly to the Minister for Defence [15].

¶ 2.6 Canada: DIA -- The Ongoing Transformation (October 2025)

Canada established the Defence Investment Agency (DIA) in October 2025 as an independent authority to replace the previous, heavily criticised system. The BUILD-PARTNER-BUY Framework prioritises Canadian industrial participation. The legislative basis is expected for spring 2026 [16] [17].

¶ 2.7 Negative Examples

Germany -- BAAINBw: The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support employs approximately 10,000 staff but suffers from up to 17 per cent vacancies (as of 2018; approximately 14 per cent by 2025) and chronic delays. Despite its size, it remains a federal office, subordinate to the BMVg and bureaucratically embedded.

Netherlands -- COMMIT: The Commando Materieel en IT (COMMIT), renamed in 2023 from the Defensie Materieel Organisatie (DMO), is organisationally part of the Ministry of Defence with limited autonomy [18].

International Comparison: Independence vs. Staff Size
Scatter plot: The more independent the procurement authority, the clearer the separation between client and procurer (green). The Swiss proposal aims for the highest independence.

Comparison of International Procurement Authorities
Colour matrix: Assessment of the 7+2 procurement authorities against six key characteristics. Green = strong, Yellow = medium, Red = weak.

¶ 3. Ten Criteria for a Modern Procurement Authority

Author's analysis: From international research and the practice of successful procurement authorities, ten core criteria can be derived. These serve as an analytical benchmark for assessing today's armasuisse and the proposed new authority.

No.	Criterion	Description	Reference
1	Institutional Independence	Separation of user (armed forces) and procurer; no directive dependency in technical decisions	OECD Principles [19], FINMA/Swissmedic as Swiss models
2	Technical Competence	Own engineering corps with specialist expertise in systems engineering, contract law and programme management	DGA France (60% managers/eng./experts) [13], FMV Sweden [9]
3	Lifecycle Cost Control	Total cost assessment over the lifecycle, not just acquisition price	UK DE&S [11]
4	Transparency and Anti-Corruption	Systematic disclosure of procurement decisions, costs and timelines	Transparency International Defence Index [20]
5	Parliamentary Oversight	Specialised procurement oversight with technical competence	PVK Report [2]
6	Competition Promotion	Open tenders as the rule; invitation procedures as a justified exception	OECD Principles [19]
7	Innovation Promotion	Risk budgets for new technologies; prototyping and spiral development	UK DASA
8	Interoperability	NATO standards (STANAGs) as tender requirements	NATO Standardization Office
9	Speed	Maximum five years from project start to first delivery for standard procurements	UK Integrated Procurement Model
10	Personnel Management	Competitive salaries; rotation between administration and industry	DE&S Trading Entity [11], DGA Corps [13]

¶ Assessment: armasuisse vs. Ideal Organisation

No.	Criterion	armasuisse Today	Ideal Organisation
1	Institutional Independence	1 -- Directive-bound (Circle 2)	5 -- Own legal personality (Circle 3)
2	Technical Competence	2 -- Limited	5 -- Own engineering corps (DGA model)
3	Lifecycle Cost Control	2 -- Focus on acquisition price	4 -- TCO as standard method
4	Transparency	2 -- Regularly criticised by EFK	4 -- Systematic disclosure
5	Parliamentary Oversight	2 -- SiK with limited access	5 -- Direct accountability
6	Competition Promotion	2 -- 97% outside WTO rules (PVK 2007)	4 -- Open tender as the rule
7	Innovation Promotion	2 -- No dedicated risk budget	3 -- Innovation division
8	Interoperability	3 -- Partially NATO-compatible	4 -- STANAGs as mandatory criterion
9	Speed	1 -- Systematic delays	3 -- Target: max. 5 years standard
10	Personnel Management	2 -- BPG pay grades	5 -- Own personnel law

Ten Criteria: Degree of Fulfilment
Horizontal bar chart: armasuisse's average is 1.9 out of 5 points, the ideal organisation scores 4.2. The largest gaps exist in independence, speed and personnel management.

¶ 4. Five Core Principles of the Ideal Organisation

Author's analysis: The ten criteria are condensed into five actionable core principles for the Swiss context.

Principle	Description	International Model	Swiss Legal Framework
1. Institutional Independence	Independent federal authority, not subordinate to the DDPS	FMV Sweden (ministerial ban) [9]	Public-law institution (Circle 3), analogous to FINMA/ENSI [21] [22]
2. Separation of Client/Procurer	Armed forces define requirements, authority procures	FMV vs. Försvarsmakten (SE), MOD vs. DE&S (UK)	Special law analogous to ENSIG
3. Personnel Independence	Own specialist staff (engineers, lawyers, economists)	DGA (60% managers/eng./experts) [13], DAPA (high civilian quota) [8]	Own personnel law (analogous to FINMA Personnel Ordinance) [23]
4. Freedom from Political/Military Pressure	Evaluations without predetermined outcomes	OECD Principles [19]	Incompatibility rules for the authority board
5. Parliamentary Control	Specialised oversight with document access	EFK (budget directly from Parliament) [24]	Strengthened SiK or new procurement oversight

Radar chart: The five core principles compared. armasuisse (red) does not exceed 2 out of 5 points on any principle.

¶ 5. Proposed Organisational Structure

¶ 5.1 Legal Form: Public-Law Institution (Circle 3)

Author's analysis: The proposed legal form is the public-law institution -- the same legal form as FINMA (FINMAG, SR 956.1) [21], ENSI (ENSIG, SR 732.2) [22] and Swissmedic (HMG, SR 812.21) [25]. This legal form offers:

Own legal personality: The authority can enter into contracts, hire personnel and appear in court in its own name.
Operational independence: The Federal Council sets strategic objectives (4-year cycle) but does not intervene in operational decisions.
Democratic control: An authority board (analogous to the FINMA Board of Directors) supervises management; Parliament exercises supreme oversight.
Own personnel law: Competitive specialist salaries outside the BPG pay grades (analogous to the FINMA Personnel Ordinance [23]).

¶ 5.2 Governance Structure

Authority Board (7-9 specialist experts):

Appointed by the Federal Council, independent
Fields of expertise: engineering, contract law, technology assessment, financial controlling, international procurement
Strict incompatibility rules: no active connections to the defence industry
Model: FINMA Board of Directors [26], ENSI Board [27]

Executive Management (CEO + Division Heads):

Operational management
Professionally qualified (engineers, lawyers, economists)

Parliamentary Oversight Commission:

Specialised procurement oversight (not just budget approval)
Access to contract documents, evaluation reports, cost developments
Model: Finance Delegation of the Federal Chambers

¶ 5.3 Organisational Divisions

The authority is divided into five specialist divisions and staff functions:

Evaluation and Competition: Market analyses, tenders, type evaluations
Contracts and Procurement Law: Contract negotiations, legal compliance, offset agreements
Technology Assessment and Systems Engineering: Technical review, system integration, testing
Lifecycle Cost Management: Total Cost of Ownership, operating cost forecasts, service life planning
International Cooperation and Offset: Government-to-government agreements, multilateral programmes, industrial participation

Staff Functions: Legal, Compliance, Communications

¶ 5.4 Personnel Strategy

Own personnel law (analogous to the FINMA Personnel Ordinance [23])
Competitive salaries for specialists (engineers, contract lawyers, technology assessors)
Fixed-term rotation between authority and industry (3-5 years) with cooling-off periods
Specialised training (analogous to the DGA engineering corps [13], UK Defence Academy of the United Kingdom)
Model: DE&S Trading Entity [11], DAPA civilian quota [8]

¶ 5.5 Financing

Budget via procurement credits from Parliament (armaments programme)
Operating costs of the authority as administrative expenditure
Difference from FINMA self-financing: the procurement authority is not a regulator that levies fees

Organisation Chart of the Ideal Procurement Authority
Organisation chart: The new authority is subordinate to the Federal Council (strategic objectives), not the DDPS. The armed forces provide requirements but have no influence on evaluations.

Governance model: Flow chart of responsibilities. Blue = mandate/control, Green = delivery/information, Red = audit (EFK), Orange = requirements (armed forces).

¶ 6. Rationale for Design Decisions

¶ 6.1 Why a Public-Law Institution?

Author's analysis: The three legal forms compared:

Criterion	FLAG (Circle 2)	Institution (Circle 3)	Corporation (Circle 4)
Independence	Low (directive-bound)	High (own legal personality)	Very high
Democratic Control	Full (via department)	High (via authority board + Parliament)	Limited (via board of directors)
Personnel Flexibility	None (BPG)	High (own personnel law)	Very high
Risk of Excessive Autonomy	None	Low (authority board as control)	High (cf. RUAG)
Implementation Time	6-12 months	3-5 years	5-7 years
Parliamentary Decision	No (Federal Council ordinance)	Yes (federal law)	Yes (special law)
Suitability	Insufficient	Optimal	Over-dimensioned

ENSI as Precedent: ENSI was created in 2009 by transforming the former Main Division for the Safety of Nuclear Installations (HSK) -- a service unit subordinate to the Federal Office of Energy -- into an independent public-law institution [22]. This is exactly the same structural transformation proposed for armasuisse.

¶ 6.2 Why Separation of Client and Procurer?

The PVK report of 2007 documented the lack of a coherent procurement strategy as a direct consequence of the institutional intertwining of the armed forces and procurement [2]. Internationally, Sweden (FMV vs. Försvarsmakten), the UK (MOD vs. DE&S), Australia (DDA) and South Korea (DAPA) all demonstrate a clear institutional separation.

¶ 6.3 Why Engineers Instead of Officers?

The DGA model shows: 60 per cent managers, engineers and experts reduce manufacturer dependency and enable independent technical assessment [13]. DAPA explicitly adopted a high civilian quota as a declared reform objective when it was established in 2006 [8].

¶ 6.4 Why Direct Parliamentary Control?

The Security Policy Committee (SiK) currently has only limited access to evaluation documents. Specialised procurement oversight -- analogous to the Finance Delegation -- with technical expertise would strengthen democratic control. Model: The EFK (Swiss Federal Audit Office) receives its budget directly from Parliament and is not bound by directives [24].

¶ 6.5 Why Particularly Suitable for Switzerland?

Author's analysis:

Existing legal models: FINMA, ENSI and Swissmedic demonstrate that public-law institutions function within the Swiss legal system and are democratically legitimised [5].
Direct democracy: The popular initiative provides a constitutional instrument to push through such a reform even against political resistance.
Militia system: An independent specialist authority with full-time experts is a necessary counterweight to the militia parliament, which reaches the limits of its competence in highly complex defence procurements.
ENSI precedent: The transformation of the HSK into ENSI (2007-2009) shows that such a transformation is feasible under Swiss federal law and leads to a functioning independent authority [22].

¶ 7. Advantages over the Status Quo

Structural Comparison: armasuisse Today vs. New Authority
Before and after: On the left, the current state (directive authority of the department head, political interference); on the right, the proposed structure (independent specialist authority, armed forces only as requirements provider).

Dimension	armasuisse Today	Ideal Organisation
Legal Form	Federal office (Circle 2)	Public-law institution (Circle 3)
Subordination	DDPS department head	Federal Council (strategic), authority board (operational)
Directive Dependency	Yes (politically steerable)	No (professionally independent)
Own Legal Personality	No	Yes
Personnel Law	Federal Personnel Act	Own personnel law
Pay Flexibility	BPG pay grades	Market-rate specialist salaries
Authority Board	None	7-9 independent specialist experts
Parliamentary Oversight	Indirect (via DDPS)	Direct (accountability report)
Client-Procurer Separation	Formal, not institutional	Institutionally anchored
Evaluation Independence	Politically influenced	Professionally independent

¶ Expected Improvements

Author's analysis, based on international benchmarks:

Schedule adherence: FMV Sweden as benchmark for small states [9]
Cost accuracy: DE&S UK significantly improved budget adherence [11]
Competition intensity: OECD Principle 3 calls for open access to procurement markets [19]
Transparency: Systematic disclosure to TI Defence Index standards [20]
Personnel quality: DGA engineering corps as benchmark for technical competence [13]

¶ 8. Context and Limitations

¶ 8.1 What the Model Does Not Solve

Author's analysis: An institutional reform of the procurement authority does not solve all problems:

Fundamental question: Which defence equipment Switzerland needs remains a political decision.
Industrial policy: The balance between domestic production and best-value procurement is a political trade-off that cannot be delegated to a specialist authority.
Neutrality policy: ITAR restrictions and the country-of-origin principle constrain the selection regardless of the organisational form.

¶ 8.2 Challenges in Implementation

Resistance from the DDPS and the armed forces: Autonomisation means loss of competence for the department.
Personnel recruitment: Competition with the private sector for engineers and technology experts.
Transition phase: Parallel operation of armasuisse and the new authority for 2-3 years.
Finding a political majority: A federal law requires a majority in both chambers.

¶ 8.3 International Lessons

Australia DDA (December 2025): Even large nations are fundamentally reforming their procurement -- it is the largest reform in over 50 years [15].
Canada DIA (October 2025): Reform is a current, international topic, not a historical debate [16].
Germany BAAINBw: Size alone does not guarantee quality -- 10,000 employees prevent neither vacancies nor delays.

¶ 9. Political Implementation Pathways

The Swiss Federal Constitution and the Parliament Act offer five pathways for initiating an institutional reform of defence procurement:

Pathway	Instrument	Timeframe	Parliament Required	Binding Force
1. Federal Council	OV-DDPS amendment (FLAG)	6-12 months	No	Ordinance, changeable at any time
2. Postulate	Review mandate to the Federal Council	1-2 years	One chamber	Federal Council must review and report
3. Motion	Binding legislative mandate	2-3 years	Both chambers	Federal Council must submit draft legislation
4. Parliamentary Initiative	Direct legislation through SiK	3-5 years	Both chambers	Law directly from committee
5. Popular Initiative	Constitutional amendment	5-10 years	People + cantons	Constitutional rank, highest binding force

¶ Recommended Multi-Stage Strategy

Author's analysis:

Immediately: Postulate in the SiK-N for a review report (armasuisse reform, international comparison)
In parallel: Call on the Federal Council to implement the FLAG conversion (interim step, no legislative change required)
1-2 years: If the review report is positive → motion for a special law (public-law institution)
3-5 years: Parliamentary deliberation and entry into force
In parallel as leverage: Prepare a popular initiative committee (creates time pressure)

¶ Popular Initiative as Leverage

A popular initiative could be launched under the title "For Independent Defence Procurement". A draft constitutional article (Art. 60a Federal Constitution) would encompass the following key elements: institutional separation of user and procurer, transparency obligation, parliamentary approval above a threshold, and independent technical review for type decisions.

The Stop F-35 initiative collected over 120,000 signatures, demonstrating that defence issues can mobilise the public. Even if rejected, a popular initiative can trigger a counter-proposal from the Federal Council -- as with the Responsible Business Initiative.

Political Implementation Pathways
Gantt chart: The five political pathways compared by timeline. The recommended critical path (orange, dashed) runs via postulate → motion → parliamentary deliberation.