What Next? Strategic Options for the Swiss Combat Aircraft Fleet

¶ 1. The F-35A Procurement and Its Challenges

¶ 1.1 Procurement Status

Switzerland made the type selection in favour of the F-35A Lightning II in June 2021. The procurement contract was signed in September 2022 [1][2].

Current situation (December 2025): The Federal Council tasked the DDPS (Department of Defence) with procuring the "maximum possible number" of F-35A within the financial framework of 6 billion francs [4]. The wording "maximum possible number" instead of the original 36 units signals a reduction to 35 or fewer aircraft due to increased prices [5][6][7].

Fixed-price promise broken: The USA unilaterally announced additional costs of CHF 650 million to 1.3 billion francs in summer 2025 [5][6][8]. The head of armaments procurement specified the range of additional costs to the media [8]. The original assurance of a fixed price is thus effectively void.

¶ 1.2 Challenges F-35A

¶ Availability (Mission Capable Rate)

The fleet-wide availability rate of the F-35 has been declining over the past five years according to the GAO. None of the three variants (F-35A, F-35B, F-35C) meets the availability targets set by the US Department of Defense [9][10].

¶ Operating Costs

¶ Canada as a Warning

Canada decided to purchase 88 F-35A in 2022. The report by the Canadian Auditor General (June 2025) documents massive cost overruns [13][14]:

Additionally, the Auditor General identified: construction delays at fighter squadron facilities (>3 years behind schedule), looming pilot shortage, and missing risk management plans for currency and inflation risks [13][14].

¶ Software Delays

The Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3) processor upgrade, a prerequisite for Block 4 with enhanced capabilities, is massively delayed. The GAO reports ongoing delivery delays [15].

¶ US Fleet Reduction

The USA itself plans to fly the F-35 less than originally envisaged -- partly due to reliability problems [12].

¶ 1.3 ITAR Dependency and Sovereignty Risks

The F-35A is entirely subject to US export control law (International Traffic in Arms Regulations, ITAR). This has far-reaching consequences for Switzerland as a neutral small state [16][17].

¶ ITAR Restrictions in Detail

¶ ALIS/ODIN: Data Transfer to Lockheed Martin and US DoD

The Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), now renamed ODIN (Operational Data Integrated Network), is the IT backbone of the F-35. It collects maintenance, logistics, and tactical data (flight routes, detected threats) and shares these globally with all F-35 operators [19][20].

Non-US partners have repeatedly raised concerns regarding data sovereignty and cybersecurity [19]. While ODIN is intended to be owned by the US Department of Defense rather than the manufacturer (unlike ALIS), the cloud backbone runs on commercial US hyperscalers (Microsoft, Amazon) [20].

¶ Mission Data Files (MDF): The "Brain" of the Jet

The Mission Data Files contain highly sensitive intelligence information about adversary threats -- radar profiles, electronic order of battle, weapon parameters. Only the USA creates and controls these files [21][22]:

• The Partner Support Complex (PSC) at Eglin AFB (Florida) produces the MDF
• Israel is the only country with fully autonomous MDF access
• All other partners depend on US cooperation
• Switzerland as an FMS customer ranks below the ACURL partners (UK/AUS/CAN) in the hierarchy
• No indigenous reprogramming capability possible

¶ No Source Code Access

The F-35 mission software comprises over 25 million lines of code, entirely under US control. No partner country receives read or audit rights. Switzerland cannot conduct independent security audits of the mission software [18].

¶ Global Spares Pool: No National Stockpiling

Spare parts are distributed through a global pool that depends on US prioritisation. Autonomous Swiss spare parts stockpiling for months -- as required for a neutral state -- is not provided for in the F-35 system.

¶ Systemic "Kill Switch"

No physical switch is needed to ground an F-35 fleet. Withholding spare parts, software updates, or MDF updates degrades a fleet operationally within 30-60 days [23][24].

¶ Historical Precedents

These cases demonstrate that the USA employs ITAR restrictions as a foreign policy leverage tool -- regardless of existing contracts.

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¶ 2. Threat Landscape and Security Environment

¶ 2.1 Changed Threat Landscape in Europe

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally altered Europe's security-political landscape. The transformation of Russian armed forces under the pressure of attrition warfare -- from classical mechanised doctrine towards drone-based warfare with industrial mass production -- has direct implications for European security [27][28][29].

Hypersonic Weapons:

Drone Swarms: The Russian war economy produces Shahed-136/Geranium-2 drones in large quantities. In October 2025, Russia deployed approximately 5'300 Shahed drones, 74 cruise missiles, and 148 ballistic missiles against Ukraine -- a threefold increase compared to the same period the previous year [32]. The cost asymmetry is fundamental: a Shahed drone costs USD 20'000-50'000, a Patriot interceptor missile USD 3-4 million -- a ratio of 1:150 [33].

Hybrid Warfare: Russia is already conducting a hybrid war against Europe, encompassing espionage, sabotage, cyber attacks, and disinformation [34]. GRU sabotage operations against European infrastructure are documented.

¶ 2.2 Specific Threats to Switzerland

The Federal Intelligence Service (NDB) published the 2025 situation report "Security Switzerland 2025" with a historically unprecedented assessment [35][36].

The NDB's threat radar shows 15 flashpoints simultaneously [35]. Switzerland is not an observer but an affected party in the global confrontation.

Specific Threats:

Sources: NDB Situation Report 2025 [35], SWP 2023 [37], armasuisse Hypersonic [38], RUSI 2024/2025 [27][28]

¶ 2.3 Consequence for Air Defence

The threat analysis yields three compelling conclusions:

1. Purely national defence is insufficient. Reaction times against hypersonic weapons are too short for a country with the dimensions of Switzerland. Without European early warning, critical seconds to minutes are lost.

2. European early warning (ESSI) is physically necessary. The "Recognised Air Picture" (RAP) extends the detection horizon by 300-500 km beyond Swiss borders and gives air defence the required warning time [39][40].

3. Suspension clause preserves neutrality. Switzerland issued a unilateral declaration upon its ESSI accession (October 2024) that enables withdrawal from the cooperation in the event of an armed conflict involving an ESSI member [39][40][41].

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¶ 3. What Switzerland Needs: Requirements Profile

¶ 3.1 Core Missions

The Swiss Air Force has two core missions:

1. Air Policing 24/7 QRA (Quick Reaction Alert): Ensured around the clock with armed combat aircraft since 2021 [42]
2. Air defence in emergency (national defence): Defence of Swiss airspace alone or in cooperation with neighbouring states [11]

¶ 3.2 Air Policing Requirements

¶ 3.3 National Defence Requirements

¶ 3.4 Technical Requirements

¶ Silent Attack -- Engagement Without Own Radar Emission

In modern air combat, every active radar emission reveals one's own position. Modern ESM systems detect adversary radar emissions at distances two to three times the radar's own detection range. A combat aircraft that aims to survive in an emergency must possess low-emission or fully passive engagement options.

EMCON profile (Emission Control): The entire silent attack sequence is conducted under radio silence: no active radar, no active data link transmitter, no radio emissions. The aircraft operates with passive sensors (ESM, IRST) and receives data links in receive-only mode.

¶ 3.5 Sovereignty Requirements

¶ Open System Architecture (OSA)

An open system architecture means documented, standardised interfaces instead of a monolithic black box:

• Hardware modularity: Interchangeable Line Replaceable Units (LRU) with standardised connectors
• Software openness: Documented APIs between mission software modules; capability to develop own modules (national cryptography, data link configurations, tactical databases)
• Weapons integration: Standardised interfaces (MIL-STD-1760 or equivalent) enabling integration of European armament without manufacturer approval

Counter-example F-35: ALIS/ODIN as a proprietary system in which all maintenance data is transmitted to Lockheed Martin [19]. No insight into data flows for Switzerland.

¶ ITAR Risks for Neutral States

ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) is the US export control law for defence articles [16]. For every weapon system containing US components: deployment, maintenance, weapons integration, and technology transfer require US approval. A combat aircraft under full ITAR control is de facto not deployable with sovereignty.

Important distinction: European combat aircraft may also partially contain US components (e.g. Gripen E: GE F414 engine, approx. 1/3 US components [50][51]). The decisive factor is the degree of dependency: a single replaceable engine represents a different risk profile than a system that is entirely under ITAR (F-35). European export regimes (France, Sweden, Eurofighter consortium) are demonstrably less restrictive for neutral buyers [17][52].

¶ Transfer of Technology (ToT)

Reference model Brazil-Sweden: Brazil received comprehensive technology transfer with the Gripen E purchase: source code access, local final assembly at Embraer, participation in software development, training of over 350 Brazilian specialists in Sweden [49][53]. This is considered the benchmark for ToT.

¶ 3.6 Political Framework Conditions

¶ 3.7 Infrastructure Requirements

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¶ 4. European Alternatives: Candidate Matrix

¶ 4.1 Candidates

The three European combat aircraft that come into consideration for Swiss procurement:

1. Saab Gripen E (Sweden) -- Single-engine, lightweight, designed for small air forces and decentralised operations
2. Dassault Rafale F4 (France) -- Twin-engine, multirole, combat-proven, designed to be ITAR-free
3. Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 4 (Germany/Spain/Italy/UK) -- Twin-engine, air superiority fighter, consortium of 4 nations

¶ 4.2 Evaluation Criteria with Weighting

The weighting follows the AHP method (Analytic Hierarchy Process) and prioritises the requirements classified as MUST:

¶ 4.3 Gripen E Assessment

Weighted overall score Gripen E: 4.35 / 5.00

¶ 4.4 Rafale F4 Assessment

Weighted overall score Rafale F4: 3.80 / 5.00

¶ 4.5 Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 4 Assessment

Weighted overall score Eurofighter Typhoon T4: 3.20 / 5.00

¶ 4.6 Overall Result

The Gripen E achieves the highest score due to its superior combination of sovereignty, availability, operating costs, and Switzerland compatibility. Limitation on effectiveness: The Gripen E has the lowest rating in effectiveness (3/5). The single-engine, lighter platform has lower payload and range than Rafale or Eurofighter. For the Swiss scenarios (air policing, air defence within own airspace), this is acceptable.

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¶ 5. Strategic Options: The Way Forward

¶ 5.1 Option A: Purely European Fleet (Ideal Case)

Configuration: 55-60 Gripen E (or another European type)

Advantages:

• Maximum sovereignty -- no ITAR dependency for the overall system
• Highest availability (>90% MC Rate with Gripen)
• A single logistics chain, one training pathway
• Close to the expert requirement of 55-70 combat aircraft [11]

Disadvantages:

• F-35 contract already signed (September 2022) -- exit costs high
• Politically difficult: Federal Council has made the type selection
• Forgoing F-35 sensor fusion advantages

Realistic assessment: This option would be ideal based on requirements, but due to the existing contract is politically hardly feasible, unless cost overruns become so massive that a contract exit becomes economically justifiable.

¶ 5.2 Option B: High-Low Mix (Realistic Compromise)

Configuration: 15 F-35A + 35 Gripen E = 50 combat aircraft

¶ Cost Calculation

Note on unit prices: Gripen E unit prices vary considerably depending on contract configuration. For this calculation, a conservative average of CHF 90 million is used, which includes a solid logistics and ToT package. The actual costs would need to be determined in a formal evaluation.

¶ Task Allocation

¶ Advantages

• 50 instead of a maximum of 35 combat aircraft within the same budget -- significantly more combat power
• Risk diversification: No single-source risk; if the F-35 supply chain is disrupted, basic operations continue with Gripen
• Sovereign basic operations: Air policing -- 365 days, 24 hours -- would not depend on US clearances
• Higher routine availability: 35 Gripen x 90% MC = ~32 available vs. 35 F-35A x 51% MC = ~18 available
• Closer to expert requirement: 50 jets vs. 55-70 required [11]

¶ Availability Comparison

¶ Disadvantages

• Two logistics chains: Different spare parts, tools, documentation -- increased complexity
• Two training pathways: Pilots and technicians must be trained on both types
• Politically difficult: Existing F-35 contract would need to be reduced

Feasibility: Switzerland operated the F/A-18 Hornet, F-5 Tiger, and Mirage III simultaneously until 2003 -- three types in parallel. Canada is actively discussing a mixed-fleet approach with F-35 and Gripen E in 2026 [59][68].

¶ 5.3 Option C: Maintain Status Quo (35 or Fewer F-35A)

Configuration: Maximum possible number of F-35A within the budget of CHF 6 billion (35 or fewer units)

Advantages:

• No contract renegotiations required
• One logistics chain, one training pathway
• Access to F-35 sensor fusion and networked combat (if functional)

Risks:

Conclusion Option C: This is the highest-risk option. All sovereignty, availability, and cost risks remain. The fleet is the smallest of all three options and fails to meet several MUST requirements or meets them only under optimistic assumptions.

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¶ 6. European Cooperation: ESSI and Complementary Technologies

¶ 6.1 European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI)

Switzerland signed the declaration of accession to ESSI on 17 October 2024 and is the 15th member of the initiative [39][40].

¶ 6.2 Why Cooperation is Physically Necessary

• Hypersonic from border to Bern: <45 seconds at Mach 8
• Cruise missiles: Exploit terrain masking in Alpine valleys; FLORAKO radar ends at the border
• Without European sensor data: Reaction time too short for defence
• ESSI advantage: "Recognised Air Picture" (RAP) extends virtual detection horizon by 300-500 km [37][39]

¶ 6.3 Neutrality Conformity

Switzerland has set out its reservations under neutrality law in a public unilateral declaration of accession [40][41]:

• Suspension clause: Withdrawal possible in the event of armed conflict involving an ESSI member
• Focus on procurement, not operations: ESSI is a procurement cooperation, not an operational integration
• Decision-making autonomy: Switzerland retains the right to decide on its level of participation
• Passive information reception: Receiving situational data ("cooperative security") does not constitute alliance membership

¶ 6.4 Complementary Technologies (Outlook)

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¶ 7. Conclusion and Recommendation

¶ 7.1 Recommendation: Option B (High-Low Mix, 15 F-35A + 35 Gripen E)

The analysis of MUST requirements, the threat landscape, and the European candidates leads to a clear recommendation: Option B -- a high-low mix of 15 F-35A and 35 Gripen E -- is the configuration that best fulfils the defined requirements.

¶ 7.2 Rationale

¶ 7.3 Risk Assessment of the Three Options

¶ 7.4 Final Assessment

Option B offers the best compromise between:

• Realism (existing F-35 contract is adapted, not dissolved)
• Sovereignty (basic operations on a European type)
• Combat power (F-35 retained for sensor fusion and networked combat)
• Fleet size (50 instead of max. 35 -- closer to expert requirement)
• Availability (~40 mission-capable jets instead of ~18)
• Budget compliance (CHF 6 billion)

The decision requires political courage, as it means a deviation from the existing plan. But the facts -- documented ITAR risks, 51% availability rate, +46% cost overrun in Canada, reduction to 35 or fewer units due to increased prices -- suggest that the existing plan does not meet its own requirements.

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¶ Sources

[1] Federal Council (2021): Air2030 -- Federal Council decides to procure 36 F-35A combat aircraft
[2] DDPS: Air2030 -- Protection of Airspace (contract overview)
[3] Federal Chancellery: Popular vote 27 September 2020 -- Procurement of new combat aircraft
[4] DDPS (December 2025): Air2030 -- Switzerland procures maximum possible number of F-35A
[5] SRF (2025): Switzerland procures fewer F-35 combat jets than expected
[6] NZZ (2025): Switzerland must accept additional costs for the F-35 combat jet procurement
[7] Flugrevue (2025): Switzerland reduces F-35 order due to exploding costs
[8] DDPS (June 2025): Air2030 -- Current challenges and further proceedings (fixed price)
[9] GAO-24-106703: F-35 Sustainment -- Costs Continue to Rise While Planned Use and Availability Have Decreased
[10] GAO-24-106703: F-35 Sustainment (PDF)
[11] DDPS (2017): Air Defence of the Future -- Expert Group Report NKF (PDF)
[12] GAO Blog (2024): The F-35 Will Now Exceed $2 Trillion As the Military Plans to Fly It Less
[13] The Globe and Mail (2025): Canada's F-35 fighter jets purchase will cost nearly 50% more than disclosed, A-G finds
[14] CBC News (2025): F-35 program facing skyrocketing costs, pilot shortage and infrastructure deficit: AG report
[15] GAO-25-107632: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter -- Actions Needed to Address Late Deliveries
[16] U.S. Department of State: International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
[17] European Security & Defence (2022): ITAR-Related Obstacles to Exports
[18] USNI News (2014): Foreign F-35 Partners Allowed More Freedom to Customize Fighter Software
[19] Infodas: Solving data sovereignty issues with the F-35 ALIS/ODIN system
[20] Air & Space Forces Magazine: F-35 Program Dumps ALIS for ODIN
[21] Airforce Technology (2021): Norway receives F-35 mission data file from USAF
[22] flyajetfighter.com: F-35 flight data -- a strategic asset but a source of dependence on Washington
[23] The War Zone (2025): You Don't Need A Kill Switch To Hobble Exported F-35s
[24] The Aviationist (2025): The F-35 'Kill Switch' -- Separating Myth from Reality
[25] CSIS: The Great Unwinding -- The U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Dispute
[26] Simple Flying: Countries The United States Has Banned From Buying The F-35
[27] RUSI (2024): The Attritional Art of War -- Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine
[28] RUSI (2025): Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo-Ukrainian War (PDF)
[29] CSIS (2025): Lessons from the Ukraine Conflict
[30] armasuisse: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles
[31] IFSH: Hypersonic Weapons in Europe (PDF)
[32] CSIS (2025): Russia's Intense Air Campaign in October
[33] Norsk Luftvern (2025): The Drone Defense Economics Crisis
[34] CSIS (2024): Russia's Shadow War Against the West
[35] DDPS/NDB (2025): "Security Switzerland 2025" -- Situation Report of the Federal Intelligence Service
[36] SRF (2025): NDB Situation Report
[37] SWP (2023): Russian Missiles and the European Sky Shield Initiative
[38] armasuisse: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles
[39] Federal Council/DDPS (2024): Switzerland signs declaration of accession to ESSI
[40] admin.ch (2024): Switzerland Signs Declaration of Accession to ESSI
[41] Defense News (2024): Switzerland Squares Neutrality With Its European Air-Defense Push
[42] Cockpit.aero: Air Policing is Ready
[43] DDPS: Air2030 -- Protection of Airspace (major events)
[44] SEPOS: Switzerland's Security Policy Strategy 2026 (consultation)
[45] Blick (2025): Federal Council decides on Air Force decentralisation
[46] VTG: Military Airbase Meiringen (cavern)
[47] armasuisse: Air2030 Overall Programme
[48] armasuisse: Four Main Criteria and Multi-Criteria Analysis NKF
[49] Saab: Transfer of Technology -- Brazilian Gripen Programme
[50] Simple Flying: What European Fighter Jets Have Critical US Components?
[51] e-International Relations (2025): The Gripen Illusion -- Sweden's Fighter Jet is Under America's Thumb
[52] Defense News (2018): A jet sale to Egypt is being blocked by a US regulation, and France is over it
[53] Saab: Gripen E-series (product page)
[54] flyajetfighter.com: Actual availability rates for the F-22, Rafale, Su-35, and Gripen E
[55] Saab (2024): Gripen E excels at CRUZEX
[56] Stratpost/Jane's: Gripen operational cost lowest of all western fighters
[57] Leonardo: Raven ES-05 AESA Radar (product page)
[58] Breaking Defense (2025): Colombia signs $3.6B deal for Gripen fighters
[59] CBC News (2026): Saab wants Canada to buy 72 Gripens and 6 GlobalEyes
[60] flyajetfighter.com: The cost of the Dassault Rafale
[61] Indian Defence Research Wing: Rafale Enters ITAR Orbit After LMB Acquisition
[62] Times of Islamabad (2026): France Refuses Source Code Access to India in 114 Rafale Jets Deal
[63] flyajetfighter.com: The real cost per hour of a combat-ready Rafale
[64] Hensoldt: Future proofing the Eurofighter Typhoon (ECRS Mk 1)
[65] Journal of Electromagnetic Dominance (2025): Typhoon Profile -- ECRS Radars Introduce Electronic Attack Functionality
[66] warwingsdaily.com: Maintenance costs of the Rafale, F-35, and Typhoon
[67] Universitat der Bundeswehr Munchen (2013): Military Economics and Cost-Effectiveness Principle (PDF)
[68] Aviation International News (2026): Saab Advocates Mixed Canadian Fleet
[69] Hensoldt: TwInvis -- Passive Radar (product page)
[70] Defense News (2023): Hensoldt Unveils Deployable Package of TwInvis Passive Radar
[71] Zvook: Acoustic Detection System (official website)
[72] United24 Media (2025): Sky Fortress -- Ukraine's Acoustic Detection System
[73] Rheinmetall (2022): The Skyranger 30 HEL
[74] Epirus (2025): Leonidas HPM Defeats 49-Drone Swarm
[75] GPK-N (September 2022): Evaluation Procedure New Combat Aircraft (PDF)
[76] NDB Situation Report 2025 (PDF)