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SW-Version alpha 0.41
Darstellung: System
Sprache: DE

Other Critical Aspects

15. ALIS/ODIN -- No Autonomous Operational Capability

The Central Logistics System

ALIS (Autonomic Logistics Information System) and its successor ODIN (Operational Data Integrated Network) constitute the central IT system for all maintenance and logistics planning of the F-35 fleet [80]. Without ALIS/ODIN, flight operations are impossible [80]. All data flows through Lockheed Martin servers in Fort Worth, Texas [48].

Documented Deficiencies

The DOT&E report of 2017 listed approximately 1,000 open deficiencies, of which 301 were high priority, and only 88 (29%) were being addressed [81]. ALIS data are often incomplete or erroneous; contractors do not rely on the system for their own work [82]. Faulty inventory data lead to unexpected groundings of mission-ready aircraft [83].

Data Sovereignty

All F-35 mission data -- flight routes, mission protocols, sensor recordings, communications metadata -- are transmitted to Lockheed Martin servers in the United States [84]. Partner countries have no granular control over their own data [84]. Norwegian F-35s transmit detailed telemetry of all pilot actions to the Lockheed Martin facility in Fort Worth [85].

Two F-35 partner countries threatened to withdraw from the programme due to concerns about data flows [86]. A Sovereign Data Management Solution was developed for some countries but does not change the fundamental dependency [87].

"Kill Switch" Debate

Officially, there is no remote kill switch [88]. However, the real dependency exists through the Mission Data Files (MDF): without current MDFs, F-35s are far less capable and more vulnerable. By cutting off maintenance support, spare parts deliveries, software updates and network access, F-35s could still fly but would be significantly more vulnerable and difficult to keep airworthy in the long term [89].

Israel: The Only Exception

Only Israel operates a completely independent system: the F-35I "Adir" features Israeli-developed mission software, separate maintenance at Nevatim Air Base without Lockheed Martin logistics, and direct access to source codes [16][17][90]. This autonomy was achieved at Israel's own expense.

Swiss Context

The F/A-18 was maintained autonomously by RUAG -- software maintained locally, without US dependency [61]. For the F-35, maintenance specifications are still being defined. RUAG is permitted to assemble and test 4 of 36 jets but requires Lockheed Martin support [62]. Final acceptance takes place in Italy [63].

For a neutral state whose entire mission data are transmitted to US servers, this constitutes a fundamental sovereignty issue.

Translated from the German version. See the German version for complete references.